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"Probabilistic .. , of relating to, or based on probability. "
I. INTRODUCTION
Fact: Every lawyer must deal with probabilities on an intimate
level.' Fact: Every lawyer practicing in America must accept the sci-
entific approach to life that permeates her society. Fact: Every law-
yer must apply her education and life experiences to the practice of
her craft.2 Inference: Therefore, every lawyer in America must
accept the scientific application of mathematical theory to probability
assessments. Reality: Probabilistic evidence faces an almost insur-
mountable resistance in the American criminal courtroom.3
There is a current debate in the scholarly literature on the
* WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1806 (4th ed. 1976).
1. This is perhaps most fundamentally illustrated by the acceptance of a case by counsel.
Throughout a case an attorney must evaluate the probability of an outcome favorable to her
client.
2. Any other mode of operation would be inconceivable because to imagine a practice
outside one's experience is impossible. It also would be unimaginable to the practitioner to
practice in a manner contrary to her educational experience. This method of practice denies a
client the zealous advocacy to which she is entitled.
3. There are instances in which general statistical evidence and the probabilistic
application thereof are accepted. DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF 33-35 (1983).
Along with these general situations, this Comment disregards any situations in which non-
randomness is the subject of the litigation, as such situations would require the admission of
relevant probabilistic evidence that was properly founded and authenticated.
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acceptability/desirability of probabilistic evidence in the courtroom,4
with the major point of contention being its use in criminal cases. The
commentary variously argues wide use, 5 almost no use, 6 and a middle
ground. As used in the current literature, the term "probabilistic
evidence" refers to the application of mathematical theories to statisti-
cal' or assumed9 distributions of characteristics within a group to help
establish the likelihood that a certain event is a non-random
occurrence. 10
For the majority of the discussion surrounding this issue, the
arguments are sophisticated and well supported. However, there is a
problem throughout the debate with the frequent and uncritical use of
the 1968 California decision of People v. Collins." This case is signifi-
cantly flawed in its supporting rationale and the pragmatic considera-
tions that motivated it. Therefore, use of Collins is unhelpful in
understanding or furthering the academic debate on the admissibility
of probabilistic evidence. In the recent case of Rachals v. State,12 the
4. For the most complete collection of Articles and Comments on this debate, see
Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. nn.2-3 (1991); 66 B.U. L. REV. n.
3-4 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970); Richard D. Friedman, Generalized
Inferences, Individual Merits, and Jury Discretion, 66 B.U. L. REV. 509 (1986). See generally
Peter Tillers, Introduction, 66 B.U. L. REV. 381 (1986).
6. See, e.g., L.J. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); Charles Nesson,
Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV.
521 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of
Proof, 66 B.U. L. REV. 439 (1986).
8. There are various methods of probability analysis, the most familiar of which is
probably Bayes' Theorem. See infra Appendix pp. 1005-08. All the methods require that
probabilities first be assigned to the characteristics of interest. Both statistical and empirical
probability use statistical data. The method of probability factor assignment chosen does not
in any way influence the computational method chosen later. See generally TERENCE
ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 404-16 (1991).
9. Those analyses making use of assumed probability figures are classical, metaphysical,
subjective and logical probability. Id. at 407-15.
10. See, e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 5; Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1350-58 (1971). Although
these articles often specifically address so-called "naked statistical evidence," that is, evidence
of guilt based solely on statistical evidence, this does not affect the analysis mathematically.
Because this Comment is confined to the narrow issue of the unhelpful nature of Collins and its
misuse, discussion of the collateral debate on the admissibility of naked statistical evidence
versus statistical evidence in conjunction with other admissible evidence will not be pursued
here.
11. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (In Bank). For the facts of Collins and the test established
therein, see infra text accompanying notes 34-64.
12. 361 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 364 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1238 (1988). The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals without
addressing the probabilistic evidence issue.
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Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the admission of probabilistic
evidence by the trial court. The court briefly discussed Collins, which
disallowed probabilistic evidence at trial, citing it as a decision con-
trary to the controlling precedent in Georgia. 13 However, even in that
brief discussion, the court managed to misuse Collins 4 by merely
stating the result without successfully interpreting or critiquing the
rationale,'5 and by encouraging the reader to look to the Collins
appendix' 6 for help in understanding the principles involved in
probability analysis. This cursory, uncritical treatment is typical of
the use of Collins by courts and academics.' 7 In addition, the Collins
appendix is neither fully correct 8 nor, even in its accurate statements,
particularly helpful to non-mathematicians.' 9
The Collins decision has been cited with some frequency in both
court opinions2" and scholarly literature.2' The main argument in the
scholarly literature concentrates more specifically on the application
of the Collins rationale to the use of Bayesian analysis, a probability
calculus, in similar settings.22 In arguing their respective positions on
this issue, those on both sides of the admissibility debate have repeat-
edly relied on Collins to provide case law to support their claims. 23
This reliance on Collins is misplaced. The use of Collins to support an
argument on the admissibility of probabilistic evidence presents at
13. Id. at 675.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 195-205.
15. Rachals, 361 S.E.2d at 675.
16. Id.
17. The specific mention of Rachals here is to give the reader a quick and simple example
of the poor use of Collins.
18. See William B. Fairley & Frederick Mosteller, A Conversation About Collins, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 242 (1974); see also Robert P. Charrow & Robert L. Smith, A Conversation
About "A Conversation About Collins," 64 GEO. L.J. 669 (1976).
19. In discussion with other students during the evidence course in which this case was
discussed, the general consensus was that the material was fairly dense and difficult to
understand. Part of this is due, no doubt, to the lack of mathematical expertise that seems to
prevail in legal circles.
20. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516, 528 (Cal. 1985), as modified (1986); People v.
Celia, 188 Cal. Rptr. 675, 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Heard, 72 Cal. Rptr. 374, 378
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
21. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing
Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 247, 254 n.26 (1990); Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the
Appearance of Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530, 545 (1989).
22. See L.J. COHEN, supra note 6; Tribe, supra note 10; see also supra note 3.
23. Among those scholars endorsing the use of probabilistic evidence are Ward Edwards,
Summing Up: The Society of Bayesian Trial Lawyers, 66 B.U. L. REV. 937, 941 (1986);
Stephen E. Fienberg, Gatecrashers, Blue Buses, and the Bayesian Representation of Legal
Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 693, 697 (1986). Among scholars arguing against the use of such
evidence is Tribe, supra note 10.
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least three fundamental problems. First, the scope of the Collins deci-
sion is not well defined. That is, the court did not give a clear indica-
tion of what use, if any, was to be made of probabilistic evidence at
trial. This ambiguity results from the court's inconsistent rationales
and unsound pragmatic motivations.24 The rationales either stem
from poor use of the evidence or from a desire to prevent the use of
such evidence due to policy concerns. This Comment illustrates the
conflict between these rationales as presented in Collins. Likewise,
the pragmatic motivations, including fear of abuse of the evidence and
ineffective rebuttal, are no more necessitated by this evidence than
many other types of evidence. Nonetheless, commentators have
argued that the standards set forth by the Collins court are clear and
distinct.25
Second, the courts that have subsequently interpreted Collins26
have failed to consistently and critically examine the rationales used
by the Collins court. This leaves those authors who relied upon Col-
lins without a present basis of support in Collins itself27 and also with-
out a way to work with the rule in those situations that do not find
Collins specifically on point.28 When subsequent decisions fail to
interpret and apply precedent consistently, reliance upon the prece-
dent for its original statement of the law is not only pragmatically
useless in the courtroom, but any theoretical basis in the original deci-
sion is also lost if used to support the original court's rationale for its
opinion.
Third, the ever-changing face of science makes reliance upon
Collins insupportable in light of the standard by which scientific evi-
dence (of which, it must be admitted, probability analysis is a mem-
ber) is judged in other contexts. 29 The scientific evidence standard
24. See infra text accompanying notes 147-156, 170-173 & 176-186.
25. Commentators typically use four factors actually stated by the California Supreme
Court, but without noting that the factors have incompatible effects on the outcome of future
cases. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of
Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 389 (1985). But see Tribe, supra note 10, at
1335-37.
26. See infra Part III.
27. There are several examples of cases in which the result in Collins should arguably be
the controlling precedent. These cases rely heavily on statistical analysis and probability
assessments. See People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Ca. Ct. App. 1991) (holding DNA
evidence admissible in murder trial); People v. Nation, 604 P.2d 1051 (Cal. 1980) (allowing
ABO blood typing and identification of the genetic marker phosphoglucomutase to help
eliminate a percentage of population as semen donors); Cramer v. Morrison, 153 Cal. Rptr.
865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing the result of Human Leucocyte Antigen paternity test into
evidence).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 229-235.
29. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013-1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("[test at issue] has not
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allows for admission when merited by the advance of technology. 30
The test for the admissibility of scientific evidence has been clearly
established. 3' Failure to successfully incorporate the Collins test with
this standard causes a direct conflict between the two tests. This con-
flict not only contravenes the common law method of adjudication by
reliance on precedent, but also necessarily weakens both standards-a
jurisprudentially unfavorable result. If the law is truly a "seamless
web," then meaningless conflicts (if not all conflicts) within the law,
and a fortiori within a given area of the law (here scientific evidence),
will operate to destroy the force not only of the conflicting strands,
but also of the entire web.
This Comment does not make any final evaluation of the desira-
bility of the use of probabilistic/statistical evidence.32 Rather, it illus-
trates how Collins is not in any manner dispositive of the acceptability
of such evidence. Parts II, III, and IV of this Comment explain why
the three reasons given above mandate rejection of Collins as a touch-
stone in the current debate. Following the conclusion, an appendix
will briefly set forth the basic principles of Bayesian analysis.33 This
appendix provides a guide for those unversed in the mathematical the-
ory that undergirds the larger debate. Furthermore, it should prove
helpful to those who wish to further investigate this arena.
II. COLLINS' INCONSISTENCIES
A. The Test in Collins
At 11:30 a.m. on June 18, 1964, Mrs. Juanita Brooks was pushed
to the ground in an alley, stunned and in pain.34 She looked up to see
yet gained such standing") (emphasis added); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238
(3d Cir. 1985) (establishing a test that admits scientific evidence upon a showing of reliability).
30. Frye is the controlling federal decision, which California expressly adopted in People v.
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Cal. 1976).
31. See, e.g., People v. Morris, 245 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Brown,
709 P.2d 440 (Cal. 1985), as modified (1986); see also text accompanying notes 209-212.
32. Although this Comment takes no position on the desirability of admission of
probabilistic evidence, any discussion of probabilistic evidence must be accompanied by at
least a cursory knowledge of the mathematics involved. Because Bayes' Theorem is most
widely discussed in the literature, see supra note 8, the Appendix is constructed to explain the
basics of that theorem. The basics of Bayes' Theorem coincide with the basics of the other
computational probability theorems and will be of use when addressing probability theories
generally.
33. For a more extensive explanation of the mathematics of Bayes' Theorem, see COHEN,
supra note 6; Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 5; David McCord, A Primer for the
Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins
and Beyond, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 741 (1990).
34. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 34 (Cal. 1968) (In Bank).
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a young woman with blond hair running away from her." Upon
investigating, Mrs. Brooks discovered that her purse was gone.36
John Bass, who lived nearby, heard "crying and screaming" from the
direction of the alley, and looked up to discover a woman running
away.37 The woman entered a "yellow" car driven by a bearded, mus-
tachioed black male. 8 Malcolm and Janet Collins were arrested
twenty-one days later and charged with second degree burglary. 9
Ms. Collins had blond hair, which she wore in a ponytail.' Mr. Col-
lins was black and had worn a mustache and beard on occasion. In
addition, Mr. Collins owned a yellow Lincoln automobile with an off-
white top.42 The only eyewitness identification was questionable, and
the couple maintained that they were at the home of friends at the
time of the robbery.43
During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimony of a math-
ematician from a state college to bolster its claim that it was the Col-
linses who committed the robbery." The witness explained the
"product rule" of probability analysis4 and, after being supplied with
probability factors by the prosecution, computed what was argued to
be the probability that any couple other than Mr. and Mrs. Collins
were the perpetrators of the crime.46 This "probability" was one in 12
million.47 The defense objected to the admission of this evidence;4
the court overruled;4 9 and the Collinses went to jail.50 Malcolm Col-
lins appealed his conviction, contending that court erroneously admit-





39. Id. at 35.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 34.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 36.
45. The product rule theorizes that if any number of "outcomes" (here, characteristics) are
mutually independent-that is, the presence of one does not influence the presence of the
others-then the probability of their occurring together is the product of their individual
probabilities. For example, the chance of rolling "boxcars," or two sixes, with a pair of dice is
calculated as follows: The chance of rolling a 6 on any one die is 1/6. When a pair of dice is
thrown, according to the product rule, the chance of boxcars (or any doublet) is 1/6 x 1/6 -
1/36.
46. Collins, 438 P.2d at 36-37.
47. Id. at 37.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 33.
51. Id. at 37-38.
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California Supreme Court agreed and reversed.52
The Collins opinion does not purport to abolish the use of mathe-
matical evidence in all situations.5 3 However, this has been its practi-
cal effect, because of other courts' reliance on the "test" established
therein.54 The decision of the California Supreme Court in Collins
has been commonly regarded as establishing a four-prong test for the
admissibility of probabilistic evidence at trial."5 The text of the opin-
ion does not explicitly enumerate the requirements for admissibility of
probabilistic evidence as prongs of a single test. In fact, the opinion
identifies two fundamental problems involved with the evidence at
issue.5 6 However, the opinion splits these two problems into four dis-
tinct issues from which the prongs have been derived."
To meet the Collins' test, a litigator must show: (1) that the
mathematical analysis was performed using probability factors" that
accurately represent the actual distributional frequency59 of those
characteristics to which they were ascribed;' (2) that the mathemati-
cal calculations were properly performed in a correct application of
the theory from which they were derived;61 (3) that the party to
which the characteristics are ascribed actually possessed them;62 and
(4) that the evidence tends to prove that there was only one distinct
unit (here, a couple)63  that could have possessed these
characteristics."
52. Id. at 33.
53. Id.
54. See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 25, at 388-89; Tribe, supra note 10. But see Hans Zeisel,
Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Jurors, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (1969) (alleging
three "errors").
56. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38. See also Randolph N. Jonakait, When Blood is Their
Argument: Probabilities in Criminal Cases, Genetic Markers, and, Once Again, Bayes'
Theorem, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 369, 373-374 (1983) (splitting the first fundamental error into
two prongs).
57. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
58. Probability factors are those probabilities assigned to outcomes (here, characteristics)
that are used in computation of aggregated probabilities. See supra note 45; see also infra text
accompanying notes 248-251.
59. As used in this Comment, "distributional frequency" is defined as the frequency that
an outcome (characteristic) occurs in a given population.
60. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
61. Id. at 39. This is an example of the incorrect application of the product rule. The
problem is not with the theory involved, but that the theory was not followed.
62. Id. at 40.
63. In Collins the unit of interest in the probabilistic analysis was a couple, a black man
and a white woman. The paradigmatic inquiry of a probabilistic analysis would involve
analyzing the characteristics of an individual. However, this is not required. It is only
necessary that a distinct unit (an individual, a couple, a trio) is the subject of the inquiry.
64. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
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Prong one demands that the party who proffers statistical
probabilities of characteristics ground them in fact.65 The prong
demands that the familiar rule of "adequate foundation" 66 be met.
The factors used in the probabilistic analysis must be relevant to "real
world" probabilities in order for resulting calculations to be represen-
tative of the actual aggregation of those probabilities,67 and for the
jury to evaluate the information intelligently. Therefore, the court
insisted that these factors be adequately founded in fact,68 and that
this foundation be laid out for the jury and the record. 69 The prosecu-
tor in Collins contended that the probabilistic evidence was merely
illustrative and was not intended to represent actual probabilities.7 °
As the court correctly noted, this argument is unpersuasive due to the
nature of the factors/characteristics chosen by the prosecutor for this
"illustration." The characteristics chosen were those possessed by the
suspects and, in large part, shared by, the defendants. 71 Such an illus-
tration misleads the jury because it is particular to important matters
in issue. Had the prosecutor attempted to illustrate the product rule
with characteristics related to, say, the probability of finding a
McDonald's employee in a blue uniform in Topeka, Kansas on a Sat-
urday during summer, his argument might well have been more
credible.72
Prong two simply requires that the mathematician perform her
job and illustrate this for the jury.73 The mathematician is there to
apply a theory that is outside the ken of the jury,74 and she must show
them that she is doing so correctly. This involves illustrating not only
the soundness of the theory, but also that the mechanics were per-
formed correctly. If not, the jury has no basis for knowing, indeed,
even believing, whether application of the theory will result in accu-
rate information on the final probability derived.75 Prong two, then,
involves failure of proof. Incorrect use or application of the theory
65. Id. at 39.
66. See generally CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 14 (1954).
67. Id.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 104-115.
69. Collins, 438 P.2d at 39.
70. Id. at 37.
71. Id. at 37 n.10.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 39.
74. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
75. The theory in Collins required independent factors. The expert, although
acknowledging this, failed to demonstrate the independence of the factors he used to compute
the answer. Collins, 438 P.2d at 39.
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will lead to results that have no tendency to prove or disprove the
allegations upon which the theory allegedly bears.
Prong three requires the proponent to show that the parties of
interest 76 possess the characteristics of interest in the statistical calcu-
lation.77 That is, there are questions about eyewitness testimony78 or
other pieces of direct evidence79 that must be answered in order for
the circumstantial evidence ° (the probability calculation) to be rele-
vant. If the direct testimony is incorrect (e.g., if the eyewitness mis-
takenly identified a redhead as a blond), then the computation based
on that evidence will be invalid. This requirement is not new to the
realm of proof.8I Eyewitnesses have always been subject to searching
inquiry into the quality of their recollection, 82 their descriptions 83 and
their observational capacity.84 This requirement needs no further
rationale for application in this context, as the same concerns are
present here.8 5 In addition, the probabilistic evidence application
does not necessitate a more stringent inquiry into these concerns.8 6
Where the direct evidence is sufficiently believable or admissible gen-
erally, there is no reason proffered by the Collins court for heightened
or additional scrutiny of the evidence.8 7
Prong four is a heightened relevancy test, requiring the evidence
prove that only one couple could have possessed the characteristics of
76. This does not necessarily mean the parties at bar, although that is the ultimate
question. This prong relates to the perpetrators themselves and whether they possessed the
characteristics of interest.
77. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
78. Id. at 40.
79. See ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 56-57.
80. Id. at 60-61.
81. See generally Robert Buckhout, Psychology and Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 75 (1976); NATHAN R. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS § 6 (Lawrence A. Vogelman & Barry C. Scheck eds., 2d rev. ed. 1991).
82. See generally, Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis
on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 332-342 (1980).
83. See ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 60-61.
84. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-140 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
85. Of course, the probabilistic analysis of the eyewitness evidence does not change the
inherent problems of eyewitness testimony.
86. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
87. No policy rationale merits extended discussion. The policy espoused in the Federal
Rules of Evidence that relevant evidence is admissible generally announces the general
consensus that more information leads to better decisions. See FED R. EVID. 402 advisory
committee's note. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at § 184. The possible attack in the
probabilistic evidence application, that the perceived certitude of the calculus merits
heightened scrutiny of the validity of the underlying evidence, goes to the weight of the
evidence and should not be used in an admissibility argument. In addition, errors in the
calculation due to necessary imprecision in the underlying assumption are readily available for
attack on cross-examination.
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interest. Assuring that the calculation does more than just not
exclude the couple may, in fact, be important."' The court, however,
made two errors in the development of this prong. First, the calcula-
tion of a forty percent possibility that another couple could be found
who possessed the characteristics of interest is factually inaccurate.8 9
Second, the court rationalized that the calculus only proved whether a
random couple could be found with the characteristics of interest, and
thus the element of particularity necessary for relevancy was miss-
ing.' However, the relevance of this calculation is clear. Had the
odds of randomness actually been one in thirty trillion, it is more than
safe to say that no couple meeting this description would occur ran-
domly. Therefore, any couple meeting the description would be the
couple of interest beyond a shadow of a doubt.
The first fundamental problem with the use of Collins in the
probabilistic evidence admissibility debate stems from the test itself.
There are significant consistency problems with the test that make it
difficult to apply as precedent and unconvincing as support on either
side of this debate. First, the interdependency of the prongs is
unclear. That is, it is uncertain from the opinion whether each prong
may be satisfied independently, or whether they are intertwined to the
extent that meeting any of the prongs will depend on satisfying other
prongs.91 The main problem with this ambiguity is that the test is
meant to solve admissibility problems. Without a clear mandate on
how to proceed under the Collins test, litigators and judges will be
hindered in applying it. Normally, the mere difficulty of applying a
test may be a reason for contending that the test is unworkable. 92
However, this argument is even stronger regarding evidence admissi-
bility, as rules of admissibility are meant to facilitate efficient trials.93
88. Relevancy requires some tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue. See FED. R.
EvID. 401 advisory committee's note. Although evidence which does not exclude a suspect
from guilt may be theoretically relevant because it will exclude some members of the general
population-and thus reduce the theoretical pool of suspects--such evidence is insufficiently
particularized to overcome its prejudicial effect. See FED. R. EvID. 403. This may be even
more true where expert testimony and concomitant credibility concerns are involved.
89. Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 5, at 493 n.12; see also Fairley & Mosteller, supra
note 18; Charrow & Smith, id.
90. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
91. The division of the four specific errors into two groups of "fundamental" errors is not
dispositive of any dependency within the groups and appears to be merely a convenient
springboard for the court's discussion. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text; see also
infra note 119 and accompanying text.
92. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 675-77 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
93. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 73 (1990); ANDERSON & TWINING,
supra note 8, at 100-104.
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Ambiguity impedes trials and causes inefficiency. 94 When an admissi-
bility test fails to promote efficiency because of its ambiguity, the test
must be found wanting, if not completely insufficient.95
Second, this consistency problem gives rise to further difficulties,
for when the interdependency of prongs is unclear, courts must
inquire into their relationship. Such an inquiry reveals that whether
the prongs are assumed to be independent or dependent, the test does
not retain any intellectual integrity.96 If the court thought that the
groupings it created helped relate dependent prongs, 97 then its under-
standing was clearly incomplete, as pragmatic concerns of logical rea-
soning would have foreclosed discussion of some of the prongs.9
Given the impressive membership of this court, this rather obvious
error is improbable. 99 The prongs within groups almost certainly are
meant to be independent of each other. Therefore, apart from the
workability in the courtroom, the Collins test is unsatisfactory for aca-
demic citation in the greater debate on probabilistic evidence.
If the Collins court meant the prongs to be independent,"°° that
is, that any prong can be satisfied without influencing the outcome of
the other prongs, then the rationales that undergird the prongs are
inconsistent. Consequently, the test is not helpful in determining
admissibility for any variation of the Collins fact pattern. 101 Thus, the
test is unworkable10 2 and academics should not use it as support for
generalized propositions. The court set forth the prongs in two
groups, each group representing one of the fundamental problems the
court believed to exist. 103 The first group of two prongs, the court
maintained, is required because the expert's testimony "lacked an ade-
94. Ambiguity is typically resolved at trial by bench hearings. The issues involved in such
hearings require preparation, argument and decision. This process slows down the progression
of the trial.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 140-146. The difficulty applying the Collins prongs
may also be evidence that the opinion was not well thought out. Certainly, academics would
hesitate to place much faith in the case if it were proven to be improvidently decided.
96. See infra notes 144-154 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 144-152 and accompanying text.
98. See infra text accompanying note 152.
99. The 1968 California Supreme Court opinion was written by Justice Sullivan, with
Justices Traynor, Peters, Tobriner, Mosk and Burke concurring. Justice McComb dissented.
Collins, 438 P.2d at 42.
100. There is, of course, the possibility that the prongs are dependent. This dependency
could occur within the groups or between the groups.
101. There will be situations sufficiently similar to Collins where such an inquiry is
unimportant. However, the academic commentary is concerned with the scope, logic and
applicability of Collins to other fact patterns and requires a logically compelling argument for
general use in the area of probabilistic evidence.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 143-146.
103. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38, 40.
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quate foundation both in evidence and in statistical theory."" ° The
first prong forces the litigator to "get her facts straight" and commu-
nicate them to the jury. The second prong tells the litigator that she
must apply the theory correctly. This group is essentially concerned
with the process of presenting evidence. Although difficult to discern
through the complexity of the opinion, a significant conflict arises
when comparing the underlying rationales of the two fundamental
errors. If these errors are assumed to be dependent upon one another,
then the rationales that support both are ultimately obliterated.
The first group of prongs addresses the sufficiency of the eviden-
tiary foundation. If the foundation is insufficient, as the court found
in Collins, then the jury cannot function properly because it has been
given irrelevant information amounting to "wild conjecture."" 5 The
second group of prongs addresses the usefulness of the theory in
assisting the jury. The Collins court found that the mathematical
technique used "unduly impressed"' 16 the jury and failed to provide
them with particularized information of the defendant's guilt, and
therefore was unfairly prejudicial. The underlying conflict between
these rationales demonstrates that they cannot be dependent and still
retain any integrity. 107 The court in prong one noted that there was
no evidence relating the probability factors used in the mathemati-
cian's computations to actual distributions of the characteristics they
were meant to represent. 10 8 The quality of the evidence used in the
prosecutor's probabilistic analysis, then, was not only poor, but was
non-existent. That is, the prosecutor failed to give the jury proof that
the factors the mathematician employed in his probability analysis
were related in any way to actual probabilities. Thus, the jury
received irrelevant evidence. 0 9 The court reasoned that such a com-
plete lack of foundation for the factors used by the prosecutor was a
"fatal gap"110 in the proof and thus made the testimony inadmissi-
104. Id. at 38.
105. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
106. Id. at 41.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 147-154.
108. Id. at 37 n.10. The factors used by the prosecutor were:
Partly yellow automobile 1/10
Man with mustache 1/4
Girl with ponytail 1/10
Girl with blond hair 1/3
Negro man with beard 1/10
Interracial couple in car 1/1000
109. Id. at 38. Irrelevant evidence is defined as "not supporting the issue of fact to be
proved." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (6th ed. 1990).
110. Collins, 438 P.2d at 39.
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ble."' This problem inheres, of course, in any expert testimony.
Because the expert's specialized knowledge will be "beyond the ken"
of the jurors, the court must require that the supporting information
be grounded firmly in relevant, accurate facts.
This requirement that a foundation for expert testimony be laid
could be satisfied, in theory, by presentation of empirical evidence
showing that the factors represented actual frequency distributions.11 2
That is, if the foundation for the expert's testimony regarding
probability factors showed that empirical data had conclusively and
definitively established the actual frequency of a characteristic in a
given population, this part of the testimony would satisfy prong
one. I13 Not only is this result logical, but the court actually stated
that empirical proof of the accuracy of the probability factors would
allow satisfaction of this prong of the test." 4 Indeed, this must be the
case, since the prong, read independently, is a test of the quality of the
factors used in the expert's testimony. ' 15
The court found a second fault with the prosecutor's method of
proof concerning the mathematician's testimony. The factors, found
in prong one to have been without foundation, were found in prong
two to have not been shown to be independent. More specifically, the
expert witness did not illustrate for the jury that the probability fac-
tors were not influenced by the presence of each other." 6 One could
erroneously read prong two to be the same as prong one-that both
failings resulted in the jury hearing irrelevant information.' 7 How-
ever, there is a vital difference between the two prongs." 8 The first
Ill. Id. It seems that the court would have disallowed the evidence on this point alone.
112. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
113. For example, if the prosecution could have shown that every ten cars in Los Angeles
were in reality yellow, then this prong of the test would have been satisfied.
114. See Collins, 438 P.2d at 39 (citing State v. Sneed, 414 P.2d 858 (N.M. 1966)).
115. The court emphasized this point when it cited Sneed. In Sneed, the court reasoned
that the admissibility of mathematical odds depended upon the demonstration of the validity
of the estimates of probability factors used for computing the odds. Sneed, 414 P.2d at 862.
The Collins court indicated that validity of the factors was important to the question of
admissibility when it argued that the prosecutor's invitation to the jury to formulate its own
estimates was a "fatal gap" in the proof. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38. This must mean that had the
mathematician who computed the final probability been able to prove the validity of the
factors he used, thereby foreclosing the jury from inserting its own estimates, he would have
satisfied the prong of evidentiary foundation.
116. This is merely the specific problem that is more generally set out in the text
accompanying notes 73-75.
117. The "legal" flaw in both prongs rests on irrelevancy. The statistical flaws involved,
however, are separate and distinct. Correcting the statistical accuracy problem would not
necessarily correct the dependency relationship flaw noted by the court. Likewise, merely
defining independent factors would not cure the statistical inaccuracy.
118. It is important to differentiate between the two prongs because this differentiation
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
prong deals with incomplete information; the second prong deals with
improper application of theory. To assure that both are correct
requires prongs that separately analyze the aspects of the information
and theory to be utilized in the proof."t 9
The second group, also consisting of two prongs, was formulated
by the court to keep probabilistic evidence from "distract[ing] the jury
from its proper and requisite function of weighing the evidence on the
issue of guilt ... ,, 120 The language used by the court is neither
unique to expert testimony in general, nor to probabilistic evidence in
specific. The concern is one of general application-that juries not be
misled in the performance of their duties.' 2' The court indicated that
prong three, the first prong of the second group, arose because the
prosecution did not-indeed, could not-prove that the guilty couple
in fact possessed those characteristics described by the eyewitnesses to
the crime.' 2 2 That is, the prosecution failed to prove that the perpe-
trators possessed the characteristics ascribed to them by the eyewit-
nesses. This has nothing to do with whether the couple at bar
possessed these characteristics. In fact, it is the correlation between
the characteristics and the couple at bar that the probabilistic evi-
dence is meant to help prove. ' 23 The opinion asserted that "no math-
ematical formula could ever establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the prosecution's witnesses correctly observed and accurately
described the distinctive features which were employed to link defend-
ants to the crime."' 24 The court was not finding any factual or com-
putational fault with the probabilistic evidence; rather, it was
asserting that the mathematical formula failed to quantify eyewitness'
error with regard to matters such as observational skills.
Observational and descriptive errors, of course, are present in
further establishes the applicability of the Frye standard. See infra notes 215-226 and
accompanying text.
119. Prong one, requiring that the data used in the probabilistic analysis be rooted in the
real world, cannot assure that prong two, requiring correct application of the theory, will be
satisfied. One can have incorrect data, and yet still perform the mathematical mechanics
correctly. Conversely, one can misapply the theory to correct data. In either case the answer
is erroneous. Neither prong helps determine the outcome of the other, as they address
completely different aspects of a similar issue-the foundation of an expert witness's
testimony.
120. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
121. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
122. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40. For a list of the characteristics involved, see supra note 108.
123. The application of probabilistic theory purports to illustrate the chances of a random
couple's having the characteristics. If the chances are so slim as to be impossible-that is,
"nonexistent" in randomly chosen couples-then any couple with those characteristics must
be a highly unique and identifiable couple.
124. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
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any eyewitness situation, and, taken in isolation, the Collins' court's
statement would defeat any attempt to use eyewitnesses to describe
the physical characteristics of assailants. For this reason, the court
attempted to soften the sweeping nature of the statement by stating
that, although this problem is present in every circumstantial prosecu-
tion, the weakness here was fatal because of the non-quantifiable
nature of the witness error possibility.125 The result, the court argued,
was that the jury would be confronted with two pieces of evidence:
the quantified probability of an individual's possessing the aggregated
characteristics 26 and some non-quantified probability of witness error
in perception, recall or description. | 27  For the court, what distin-
guished Collins from other circumstantial prosecutions is that in all
other situations the non-quantified observational error is not con-
fronted with a highly specific quantity. 2  This analysis applies with
equal force to the converse situation, where eyewitness testimony will
not be confronted with forceful counter-evidence. This is not an
insignificant problem. The court maintained that a jury could not
"resist the temptation" to give the quantified evidence disproportion-
ate weight. The court did not consider that empirical data might be
compiled theoretically so that witness error could be quantified, as it
suggested in prong one.' 29 This inadequacy may be further evidence
that the court did not fully consider its opinion. 130
The fourth prong, requiring the prosecutor to prove that the
couple at bar is "the guilty couple,"'' differs only slightly from the
third prong. In prong three the error lay with the theory's perceived
inadequacy to deal with non-quantifiable witness error. 32 In prong
four the error is also connected to the theory, but is related to the
125. Id.
126. The court calls this quantity a "numerical index of probable guilt." Id. However, this
characterization assumes the outcome and does not indicate that the number actually
represents the possibility that another couple could be the couple present at the time of the
robbery. There are other factors bearing on the guilt of the couple at bar that are not
subsumed into this "index."
127. This problem is one contemplated by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R.
EVID. 104 and advisory committee's note. The broad nature of this concern is a major
motivating factor behind evidence admission rules.
128. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
129. The court did consider such a possibility in prong (1). See supra notes 112-115 and
accompanying text. It is just this type of inconsistency that makes the Collins test
inappropriate for academic citation.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
131. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
132. There may be other non-quantifiable errors that would be of similar concern, such as
witness credibility. These types of errors are present in all situations involving witness
testimony. However, all scientific evidence implicitly, and often explicitly, recognizes such
errors.
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result, not the process. 133 The court reasoned that the analysis could
do no more than show that a randomly chosen couple would possess
the characteristics analyzed by the mathematician.134 This is exactly
what the analysis purports to do-analyze the probability that ran-
domly selected units would possess the characteristics of interest.
135
The argument proceeds as follows: (1) certain characteristics exist in
the perpetrators; (2) those characteristics exist in a certain ratio in
the general public; (3) the chance of finding a random couple with
those characteristics is vanishingly small; (4) any couple with such
characteristics must not be random; (5) any non-random couple with
the characteristics must be the couple identified by the eyewitnesses;
(6) that couple must be the perpetrators. This argument proceeds
under the assumption that no frailties exist in the foundation evi-
dence. The only aspect of the "inference chain" 136 that involves the
probabilistic computation is the minute chance that the characteris-
tics exist in random couples. The court, however, failed to appreciate
the probative value of such an analysis, and instead attempted to
show137 that, even given the analysis, the chances were very high that
the characteristics could be duplicated by at least one other couple
capable of having committed the robbery. 138 Rigorous analysis by
statistical commentators' 39 has shown that the court's attempt to dis-
credit the analysis' result is ultimately unsuccessful and undermines
this portion of its analysis. Additionally, the court's rationale is ulti-
mately that there could be a fault with the probabilistic analysis hav-
ing proved exactly what it was designed to prove-an untenable
"fault."
Among the rationales a court, commentator or litigator are most
likely to discover in Collins and infer as the motivation for the deci-
133. Prongs (3) and (4) do not fare much better when assumed to be dependent upon each
other. Whether eyewitness accuracy in perception, memory or recall could ever be shown to
be quantifiable (prong (3)) would have no bearing on whether the theory could ever show
anything more than the probability that a randomly selected couple would possess the
aggregated characteristics (prong (4)). Furthermore, showing that the theory necessarily
pointed to only one couple would never help ascertain whether the witness had accurately
perceived and related the characteristics of the assailants to third persons. Again, as with
prongs (1) and (2), assuming dependency of the prongs within each group is simply unhelpful
in determining the outcome of any prong.
134. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
135. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to attempt to prove the intended end result of a
probabilistic analysis. However, the court, without realizing the impact of its concession,
admitted that identification as a result of uniqueness of random-characteristic-frequency-
aggregation is the end result of probabilistic analysis. See id. at 40-41.
136. ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 89-90.
137. Collins, 438 P.2d at 42-43.
138. Id. at 40.
139. See sources cited supra note 18.
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sion are: (1) when a statistician testifies, for her testimony to be
admissible it must have adequate foundation in empirical data and the
theory in use must be properly applied to that data;'14 (2) when a
statistical theory provides a quantified value for the jury on an issue
closely aligned with the guilt of a suspect and some non-quantifiable
refutation of that value is all that is available for rebuttal, then the
quantified value is inadmissible;' 4' (3) when a statistical theory pro-
vides probabilistic information whose probative value rests on its ten-
dency to eliminate the remainder of the population rather than
directly identify the suspects, it is inadmissible as lacking relevance. 42
These may not be the only rationales a litigator may be able to formu-
late, and their enumeration is not meant to imply otherwise.
It is not clear from the opinion which, if any, of the three ratio-
nales 143 are more important and which rationales, if fulfilled, may
override the others, thus allowing admission. Moreover, a lower
court faced with novel situations in this area will have no guidance in
formulating a test that meets the Collins objective, as that objective is
unclear from the rationales underlying Collins when the prongs are
read independently. Therefore, Collins is an unsuitable touchstone in
the current debate on probabilistic evidence.
If one assumes that the prongs are dependent, the Collins test is
also unworkable. If the prongs are dependent upon one or more of
the other prongs, then they not only have different rationales, but they
also directly conflict with each other. The result is not mere ambigu-
ity as to the court's intent, but outright logical conflict. Thus, the
argument that ambiguity causes the opinion to be inappropriate for
academic citation'" would be even stronger where the prongs are
dependent. Again, the ultimate issue is how the rules of evidence 45
will determine the course of a trial. If the test is unworkable for the
courts and practitioners, 46 then there is little use in arguing that the
test itself is sound. If one assumes that the prongs are interdependent,
then there are additional facial (interdependence within the two
groups), as well as more subtle (interdependence between the two
groups), difficulties with the Collins test.
The court began its opinion by noting that it "discern[ed] no
140. Derived from prongs (1) and (2).
141. Derived from prong (3).
142. Derived from prong (4).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
145. This does not necessarily include only the statutory rules, but also the common law
interpretation thereof.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
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inherent incompatibility between the disciplines of law and mathe-
matics and intend[ed] no disparagement of the latter as an auxiliary in
the fact-finding processes of the former."' 4 7 Quite logically, then, the
court began an inquiry into the mechanics of the application of the
product rule in the case at bar. 148 The first group of two prongs can-
not be read as anything else. Finding the application performed
incorrectly 49 on erroneous "data,"'' 0 the court concluded that the
evidence was irrelevant and misleading. The court then inquired into
the suitability of the product rule for helping triers of fact."'5 This
inquiry concerns the second group of two prongs. The court con-
cluded that the "technique . . . so distorted the role of the jury"'52
that it could not be allowed. The two groups need to be discussed
only when a court concedes the general proposition that probabilistic
analysis may be admissible at trial. Otherwise, there is no need to
discuss the expert's testimony or application of the theory in any par-
ticular situation. To do so indicates that there might be value in
allowing such an analysis to stand. Had the court in Collins simply
restricted its discussion to the last two prongs, the result and the
rationale would have been clear: "This type of evidence is incompati-
ble with our system of proof, and so is inadmissible." However, by
preceding this analysis with the analysis of the application, the court
seemingly and necessarily implied that there was some merit in under-
standing the accurate application of the product rule.
There is no convincing argument that the court merely meant to
edify the general reader or that the court simply enjoyed a brief foray
into the realm of mathematics. The foundation analysis 53 was unnec-
essary to warn counsel that such proof would not be accepted at trial
as the complete bar of probabilistic evidence that is effected in the
second group of prongs could hardly be a more forceful admonition
against its use. Therefore, the court had a notion that there was some
utility in the application of probabilistic evidence at trial.154
147. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33.
148. See id. at 36-39.
149. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
151. Collins, 438 P.2d at 39-41.
152. Id. at 41.
153. Prongs (1) and (2).
154. The argument might be made that court gave a full explanation of the incorrect
application of the product rule so that the lower courts might distinguish this from other
probabilistic theories, so as to allow other theoretical applications into evidence. It is
ineffective to attempt to cabin this bar to the product rule alone, due to the incredible
simplicity of the product rule as compared to other probabilistic theories. Furthermore the




The prongs cannot be read as interdependent within their groups
because of pragmatic concerns; they cannot be read as interdependent
between groups because of the conflict of their rationales. Therefore,
the prongs could not have been intended to be dependent upon each
other. This problem, along with the inconsistencies generated by
attempts at reading the prongs as independent of each other, makes
the Collins test inappropriate as academic support in the debate on
probabilistic evidence.
B. The Collins Test and Effective Counsel
In addition to the inconsistencies found in the opinion, the court
offers unsound pragmatic reasons to justify its decision. The court
was concerned with: (1) the abuse of probabilistic evidence (espe-
cially through inaccurate testimony that opposing counsel could not
effectively analyze, and therefore, rebut);155 and (2) the "sorcerer"-
like nature of mathematical computations.'56 Neither of these
problems, however, merits the court's ultimate decision.
The most egregious abuse of probability analysis by the prosecu-
tor in Collins occurred in the assignment of probability factors. 5 '
While insisting that he was only illustrating the effect of aggregating
probabilities, the prosecutor had the expert mathematician assume
values for computation 5 ' that were directly related to the personal
characteristics of the defendants 159 and not based on any statistical
data."6 Thus, the jury was confronted with an unfamiliar theory,
based on unsubstantiated data applied to "illustrate" the effect of mul-
tiplying probabilities. 6' The opposing counsel did not possess the
expertise to spot these and other flaws in the prosecutor's case. 162 At
the conclusion of the expert's testimony, the jury was left with the
impression that the chances of these characteristics belonging to any
one random couple were one in twelve million. 163 However, this was
155. "[O]nly a defense attorney schooled in mathematics 0 could successfully keep in mind
the fact that the probability computed by the prosecution can represent... the likelihood that
a random couple would share the characteristics .... [F]ew defense attorneys ... could be
expected to comprehend this basic flaw in the ... analysis." Collins, 438 P.2d at 40-41.
156. "Mathematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society... must not cast a spell
over [the juror]." Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 36-37.
158. Because the expert witness stated that he could not assign probability factors for these
characteristics, "the prosecutor himself suggested what the various probabilities should be and
these became the basis of the witness' testimony." Id. at 38.
159. Id. at 38.
160. Id. at 36-37.




UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
not the end of the prosecutor's "proof"; he suggested to the jury that
his estimates were "conservative," and opined that the probability of
the aggregation of these characteristics was actually more like one in a
billion.1 64 Further, the prosecutor invited the jury to substitute into
the calculation its own estimates of the probability factors' magnitude
for those of the prosecutor. 165 Finally, the prosecutor failed to have
the statistician establish the independence of the probability factors-
factors which the court quite clearly shows were not independent.
166
The court was correct that this omission is misleading to the average
juror. However, it is not grounds for damning the entire realm of
probabilistic evidence. An illustration elucidates this point.
Imagine a trial in which the plaintiff wishes to establish as an
element of the claim that AIDS could be transferred via human
tears. 167 To help establish this, the plaintiff calls a specialist in the
field of virology.' 6  The plaintiff's counsel asks the expert to assume
that humans transmit viruses exactly as rats do and that rats can
transfer hepatitis through teardrops. The expert is then asked to
apply his knowledge, given the assumptions about the hepatitis virus'
transmissibility, to the question of whether humans can transfer
AIDS via tears. If the virologist answers yes, and opposing counsel is
insufficiently versed on disease transmission to recognize the rather
obvious error in this method of proof, his only opposition to the testi-
mony is likely to be something akin to "doctors have been known to
be wrong." In such a case, the court would be faced with the same
kind of abuse present in Collins. However, it is hard to imagine that
anyone even remotely familiar with Anglo-American courts would
advocate abolishing expert medical testimony on these grounds. 69
The possibility of abuse of probabilistic evidence is an insufficient
justification for eliminating it altogether. From procedural abuse of
164. Id.
165. Id. at 37 n.10. The prosector also invited the defense to offer estimates on the
probabilities involved. Id. This was surely an attempt to get the defense to offer probabilities
that were much higher than would be reasonable, but would still result in a calculation that
showed only a remote possibility of the random aggregation of the characteristics in any one
couple.
166. Id. at 39.
167. This hypothetical is used by the University of Florida in its peer-counseling program
on AIDS-awareness to illustrate the hysteria surrounding the AIDS crisis. Nothing in this
Comment should be interpreted as providing information on actual AIDS transmission modes.
168. Virology is the study of viruses and the transmission of viral diseases.
169. The Collins court does not indicate that the abuse alone is dispositive of the issue of
admissibility of probabilistic evidence. However, it clearly finds this an important
underpinning of the abolition rationale. See Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
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"emotion practice"' 70  to substantive abuse of the jury system, 7 '
opportunities abound for the unethical attorney. The use of probabil-
istic evidence, limited as it is to the courtroom, should not be singled
out as especially dangerous in this regard. The Collins decision itself
shows that courts have the ability to ferret out instances of abuse.
The record established at trial makes review of the actual evidence
admitted possible, and the nature of the evidence requires that only
extremely qualified individuals testify. 72 In addition, the time and
cost required to do a complete analysis of the data necessary to accu-
rately testify on probability necessarily limits the use of such
evidence. 173
A separate comment on the ability of opposing counsel to effec-
tively rebut plaintiff's use of probabilistic evidence7 4 and its influence
on admissibility is also appropriate. In the AIDS transmission hypo-
thetical, the same potential danger of opposing counsel's inability to
rebut exists. However, the answer most likely given in that situation
is: "Get your own expert." Indeed, some commentators contend that
the courtroom has become a "battle of the experts."'" While this
result is hardly desirable, the best remedy in such a situation is to
fight fire with fire. It is difficult to believe that in a medical malprac-
tice case, for instance, either side would prepare for trial without
obtaining an expert to analyze the available data and rebut the testi-
mony of the other side's expert. The "real world" presents issues that
170. See John F. Cannon, Remarks, The History and Purpose of Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 10 (1985).
171. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (discussing jury tampering).
172. Note that the nature of probabilistic evidence requires that the qualifications of those
experts who testify be very high, thus making the pool of potential expert witnesses small. The
need to maintain a high reputation in the academic community also works to heighten the
credibility of most experts. It is helpful in this argument to recall the academic isolation and
unfavorable comment that accompanied Carl Sagan's attempt to make astronomy a pop fad,
which eventually resulted in a significant fall from grace in the public eye as well.
173. To adequately analyze even extremely sterile situations requires a great deal of
sophisticated and costly work. The expense of expert testimony necessarily limits the use of
such testimony to cases of sufficient size and complexity, in which the jury might benefit
greatly from an accurate analysis and presentation of this type. Also, opposing counsel will be
alert to possible abuse during this extended study. It is arguable that very few cases involve
situations that are simple enough to allow for the use of probabilistic evidence in the first place.
Moreover, the cost resulting from such stringent requirements will help curb the use of
probabilistic evidence in the criminal arena, where critics argue its abuse is more dangerous.
See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 10, at 1368-1377; Shaviro, supra note 21, at 532-533.
174. This inability to rebut was one of the evils feared by the Collins court when it
addressed the abuse of probabilistic evidence. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Bruce Gardner, Prosecutors Should Think Twice - Before Using Experts in
Child Abuse Cases, 3 CRIM. JUST. 12 (1988); see also Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of
Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 848
(1988).
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are too complex for an advocate to competently spot flaws in all types
of technical testimony. Opposing counsel has the tools of discovery to
allow her to seek out her own experts. 176 Beyond this, she may ask
the court to appoint an expert. 177 Finally, opposing counsel's inability
to effectively argue against technical evidence should not serve as an
excuse to exclude the otherwise valid evidence of her opponent.
Allowing this excuse would contravene the ideals of zealous advocacy
and truth-seeking that underlie the adversary system, 7 and could
effectively lead down a "slippery slope" 179 where the least common
denominator determines the scope and admissibility of evidence
presented at trial. The principle that counsel may use only what her
opponent can already rebut or argue effectively prevents new and use-
ful methods of argument from entering the courtroom'I°---an even
more undesirable outcome than the circus-of-experts danger already
mentioned. Although preventing the development of useful argu-
ments surely cannot be the intention of the Collins court, it is the
logical end result.
The court's second concern-that mathematics is a "veritable
sorcerer"' 8 ' that will rob the jury of its appropriate function-fails on
similar grounds. The very use of expert witnesses indicates that the
resolution of complex fact situations often requires that triers of fact
be given conclusions that they could not draw for themselves. 8 2 This
does not mean, however, that the jury will not determine the outcome
of the ultimate issue. Other considerations exist beyond the sorting
out of technical facts.18 3 For example, the jury has the right to find
the explanation offered by the opposing party's expert more convinc-
ing or not to believe a witness. Nor is it entirely clear that striking
expert testimony on probability will fully resolve the issue. In Collins,
for example, the jury might have believed, from personal experience
or acquaintance, that interracial couples were not as rare as statistics
176. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2017 (West 1991).
177. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 1991).
178. MODERN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl.
179. Although slippery slope arguments usually fail to withstand academic scrutiny, the
theoretical possibility tends to illustrate the point rather forcefully.
180. This principle is contrary not only to the Downing test on scientific evidence
admissibility, which promotes the admission of novel scientific evidence, but also to the Frye
test of admissibility, which allows for the continued growth of acceptable types of evidence.
See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
181. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33.
182. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
183. This situation is easily distinguished from those where the expert testimony is on legal




made them seem. 18 4 The jury might also have found the expert him-
self unconvincing due, perhaps, to his personal demeanor. Jurors,
after all, are not sheep who blindly follow whoever leads them, but
independent thinkers with minds of their own. Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that mathematics, as compared to other scientific
evidence, will be of particularly potent probative force to a trier of
fact. For instance, medical doctors are certainly influential in their
presentation of detailed physiological evidence, yet courts have no
problem allowing its introduction. When deciding issues of fact, a
jury is not required to understand all possible intricacies associated
with these facts;'8M rather, it is asked to make a logical, reasonable
decision based on the information before it.'86 In light of this, the
Collins court's contention that difficult-to-comprehend theories are
improper because of the powerful influence they exert on juries is
unpersuasive.
The question of how much weight to assign particular pieces of
evidence has long been regarded as strictly within the domain of the
jury. 8 7 In Collins, the court noted that the jury could not help but
"accord disproportionate weight" to the probabilistic evidence.188
Yet the same argument would apply in the AIDS transmission hypo-
thetical given above. The testimony of a leading virologist on such a
complex issue would certainly be accorded great weight by a jury who
believed the witness credible, and might very possibly overshadow the
opposing counsel's argument that "doctors have been known to be
wrong." Yet it is precisely for this reason-to help the jury resolve
issues of fact that cannot possibly be within their technical knowl-
edge-that experts are brought into litigation. 8 9 Where there is no
184. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33. One explanation for this belief may be locale. A reasonable
juror may find the testimony incredible based upon a belief that interracial couples in a car in
greater Los Angeles are more common than the figures indicate. A juror may believe that the
probability factor for interracial couples applies solely to interracial couples who are
romantically involved, thereby making the factor smaller than it would be if interracial couples
who are merely friends were included in the assessment. Personal experience may also cause a
reasonable juror to discredit the expert's testimony.
185. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The wide adoption by state courts of Frye effectively makes
this a general evidence principle. But see MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at § 203 (criticizing the
standard in Frye).
186. After all, the law is concerned "with probabilities, not certainties." Blum v. Airport
Terminal Services, Inc., 762 S.W.2d 67, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Jackson v. Ray Kruse
Construction Co., 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)).
187. "IT]he weight of the evidence ... is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide."
People v. Rhodes, 258 Cal. Rptr. 71, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citing People v. Sherren, 152
Cal. Rptr. 828, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)); see also People v. Remiro, 153 Cal. Rptr. 89, 113
(Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
188. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40.
189. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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abuse of the facts or theory involved, the mere strength of an expert's
testimony is something to be resolved by the jury, and should not be a
consideration in determining whether to admit such evidence. 19°
III. SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF COLLINS
The second fundamental problem with the use of the Collins test
to support academic comment on the introduction of probabilistic evi-
dence at trial lies in its interpretation by courts in and outside Califor-
nia. Sometimes examining the rationales behind the decision,1 91
sometimes not,192 courts have applied the Collins test in a manner that
causes the cases citing it to conflict. This not only makes the test
difficult for trial judges to apply, but also weakens any support Collins
might have provided to academics. If the rationale of the test has
been altered in fact, then there is no real present support for the
rationale of the original precedent. That is, if the courts have failed to
follow the rationale of the precedent, then academic comment assert-
ing that the decision supports a given view of the case is unconvinc-
ing. 193 In the debate on probabilistic evidence, this is an especially
dangerous misuse because academic debate is not furthered. In addi-
tion, courts that rely on academic discourse in this complex area may
be lead to adopt a rationale which has been indiscriminately
applied. 194
At least one court outside California has affirmatively decided
not to follow Collins. In Rachals v. State,'95 the Court of Appeals of
190. Stephen C. Petrovich, Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment, 24 GA. L. REV. 669
(1990) (alleging forceful evidence needs established guidelines for allowing admissibility, but
recognizing the ready admissibility of DNA evidence in the courts); Janet C. Hoeffel, Note,
The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant,
42 STAN. L. REV. 465 (1990) (alleging that only recently have courts even begun to inquire
into whether DNA is admissible, and that the arguments on DNA may be lost on all but the
scientists who are presenting it).
191. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 91 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970), vacated, 491 P.2d
374 (Cal. 1971); Bodenshatz v. State Personnel Bd., 93 Cal. Rptr. 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
192. See, e.g., People v. Slone, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Law, 114
Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
193. I do not mean to suggest that such support is necessary for convincing argument, but
rather, that citing outdated precedent does not help further the intellectual debate.
194. This does not assume that the courts who rely on such discourse ultimately apply the
Collins result. The commentator who relies on Collins may cite the case as evidence that an
opposite result is favorable, or if she cites it as the desired result, may present such a poor case
that a court declines to apply Collins. These situations are rare, but there are instances where
such citation does not result in the establishment of the Collins doctrine. See infra text
accompanying notes 195-196. The result, however, is unimportant as far as this Comment is
concerned. It is merely the lack of Collins' probative force in making a decision in this debate
that is at issue here.
195. 361 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
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Georgia cited Collins as precedent conflicting with the controlling
rule of the state, which it felt constrained to follow.' 9 6 However, that
court's use of Collins poses significant problems that are symptomatic
of the nature of the Collins approach. These problems help illustrate
the complexity of probabilistic analysis, and the resulting inconsis-
tency in rationales when courts attempt to paint with a broad brush in
this area. The Georgia court, without needing to do so-and without
actually investigating the rationales involved--effectively barred the
use of Collins to prevent admission of probabilistic evidence in
Georgia. 197
The precedent cited by the Georgia court in its opinion is not
clearly controlling on the issue of the admissibility of probabilistic evi-
dence. The controlling precedent cited by Rachals is Williams v.
State,'98 a forty-page opinion, of which only four sentences are
devoted to the admissibility of probabilistic evidence. That court held
that "experts are permitted to give their opinions, based upon...
mathematical computations."'199 After citing a case for the proposi-
tion that counsel are allowed wide latitude on suggestion in closing
arguments, the opinion stated that "[s]uch suggestions may include
those based upon mathematical probabilities. '"2 °° The Rachals court
recognized the cursory treatment of the issue in Williams,20' yet failed
to take advantage of the opportunity to invoke the Collins doctrine.2 °2
An outside observer could only infer that the Rachals court, no mat-
ter its protestations, was not fully convinced of the validity of the
Collins approach.20 3
It would be foolish to assume that the Rachals court invalidated
196. Id. at 675.
197. Id. The situation in Rachals, although unusual, helps illustrate the thrust of this
Comment. Whether the courts and commentators apply Collins or discourage the application
of its doctrine is irrelevant to the larger debate concerning probabilistic evidence. What
matters is that Collins is unpersuasive for purposes of critically examining the precedent in the
area of probabilistic evidence.
198. 312 S.E.2d 40 (Ga. 1983).
199. Id. at 72 (citing Stewart v. State, 268 S.E.2d 906, 912 (Ga. 1980) (emphasis added)).
The opinion dealt with the appeal of Wayne Williams, an Atlanta man convicted of murdering
two young African-American males in the early 1980's and suspected of murdering several
others. He had been sentenced to two consecutive life terms. Id. at 48.
200. Id. at 73.
201. Rachals, 361 S.E.2d at 675.
202. Id. The opportunity for invoking the doctrine was, in fact, enormous, since Williams
gave limited consideration to the issue and Stewart v. State, from which Williams cited,
allowed mathematical computation essentially amounting to addition and subtraction. See
Stewart, 268 S.E.2d at 912. Note, however, that one could very credibly argue that the jurors
gave incredible deference to those computations because they expected them to have been
performed correctly.
203. Rachals, 361 S.E.2d at 675.
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another jurisdiction's rule of law solely on the basis of precedent. Nor
is it likely that the Georgia court was incapable of adequately assess-
ing the applicability of precedent to the Rachals case. The only logi-
cal assumption, therefore, is that the court realized what the effect of
its decision would be on the use of probabilistic evidence at trial and
chose to stand by it, even in the face of doubts about the validity of
the controlling precedent's rationale.
Given that the Rachals court could have applied the Collins test
without actually violating the precedent had it so desired,2° there
must be some reason why the court cited Collins approvingly without
applying its logic. Most likely, the court felt that it could not have
applied the logic of Collins without doing violence to the controlling
rule in Georgia. 205 The court was not looking simply at the mathe-
matical computation, for which a quick cite to the Collins test could
have done away with probabilistic evidence in Georgia, or at least
made its admission dependent upon substantially tougher criteria.
Rather, it was focusing on the larger issue of the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence at trial, which by that time had become so pervasive
that it guided even when not expressly called into use.
IV. THE FRYE TEST AND PROBABILISTIC EVIDENCE-CONFLICT
WITH COLLINS
Science affects our everyday lives as a result of the technology
that pervades our society. Yet technological advances are not the
only ways in which science permeates the modem world. Indeed, the
soul of science lies not in advanced technology, but rather in the
method of attaining that technology.
The use of the scientific method has not been limited to univer-
sity laboratories. It has been applied throughout the social sciences
and jurisprudence. 2°6 The test set forth in the famous case of Frye v.
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
205. The controlling rule is that of scientific evidence in general, not the one of admissibility
of mathematical computation. Georgia does not follow the Frye standard. Graham v. State,
308 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). However, the judge looks to the same type of
criteria that other scientists in an expert's field would look to in order to determine if the
scientist is credible and the expert's testimony admissible. Id. The real difference between the
Georgia standard and the Frye standard is that the judge applying the former can allow
testimony about scientific theories considered by experts to be scientifically sound, even if those
theories have not found general acceptance in the scientific community.
206. A growing number of legal journals have used empirical studies to support the
hypothetical contentions of scholars. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate
Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991); Donald H. Stone, The Moral
Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent is Homosexual or Lesbian-An Empirical Study,
23 SUFFOLK L. REV. 711 (1989).
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United States207 for the admissibility of scientific evidence is whether
"'the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are
unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it [due
to its specialized nature]' . . . [and the application of that specialized
knowledge has] gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."208 Ironically, this principle itself can be "scientifi-
cally" applied. That is, counsel observes what methods of proof will
benefit her client; she sets forth a hypothesis for the court in the form
of offering the proof at trial; the court tests her hypothesis, and if it
finds the hypothesis valid in the "particular field" of trial practice,
accepts the proof as logically and permissively influencing the out-
come of facts in issue.
The Frye standard of admissibility has been almost universally
accepted by courts.209  The California Supreme Court expressly
adopted it for the first time in 1966,210 a position reiterated by the
California Supreme Court in 1976.211 The Frye standard has been
used to allow into evidence results of such scientific methods as ABO
blood typing and DNA evidence.212 Courts have almost universally
applied the Frye standard to all types of scientific evidence save one-
probabilistic evidence.
The use of probabilistic analysis has been disallowed without
fully examining how the Frye standard would affect the outcome of
such an inquiry. There can be no doubt that probabilistic analysis is a
member of the scientific evidence world.21 a Because probabilistic
analysis is a type of scientific analysis, the standard established in Frye
would seem to be the appropriate test to apply to the admissibility of
probabilistic analyses.214
The Frye test functions to assure a high level of reliability of sci-
entific evidence in several areas,21 5 including the validity of the appli-
cation of the scientific principle and the qualifications of the experts
207. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
208. Id. at 1014.
209. See, e.g., Dumond v. State, 743 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Ark. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Kater, 477 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Mass. 1983).
210. Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 388 (Cal. 1966). The first mention of Frye in
California was in People v. Wochnick, 219 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). California
restatements of the Frye test, however, remained "fuzzy" until Huntingdon.
211. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
212. See supra note 27.
213. Indeed, probabilistic evidence underlies statistical analysis, and thus forms the very
basis for most of modern scientific testing and analysis.
214. One should recall that Bayesian analysis is the most widely discussed method of
probabilistic analysis in the legal arena.
215. See Michael H. Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence:
Admissibility of Evidence of a Scientific Principle or Technique-Application of the Frye Test,
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interpreting the results of the application. These two areas were of
particular concern to the Collins court, which most feared incomplete
or inaccurate application of the theory2 6 and the presentation of
overwhelming and irrelevant evidence to the jury.2 17
The Frye test protects the validity of the application of the scien-
tific principle primarily by requiring that scientists generally accept
the technique at hand.21 8 The test provides for critical examination
and agreement on the method and results of a scientific inquiry by
those who are capable of understanding the processes involved.21 9 It
is important to note that this "check" on the evidence rests on our
modern conception of the universality of scientific principles. That is,
the check on science rests in science, and is not independently assaila-
ble. It is clear that the Frye test "requires the court tofind ... that the
scientific test is reliable .... "220 This is all that the first fundamental
error asserted by the Collins court concerns. 22 Because application of
the Frye standard would have prevented the type of abuse correctly
pointed out by the Collins court,222 there was no need for the specific
enumeration of such a requirement in Collins.
The Frye test protects against the use of overwhelming and irrele-
vant evidence by requiring expert witnesses to be sufficiently quali-
fied 223 and the application of a scientific theory to be generally
accepted in the pertinent community of experts.224 The opposing
party has ample opportunity to blunt the impact of the expert's testi-
mony by cross-examining her on the stand 225 or investigating facts not
disclosed by the expert on direct examination.226
By requiring highly qualified experts, the Frye test assures that
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence will be kept out of the record.
19 CRIM. L. BULL. 51, 53 (1983) (arguing that the Frye test is conservative and thus insures
that admissible scientific evidence is highly reliable).
216. See Collins, 438 P.2d at 38.
217. Id. at 38, 39. The court found it curious that the prosecutor invited the jurors "to
substitute their own 'estimates' should they wish to do so." Id. at 38.
218. See Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 52-53.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
221. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
222. Collins, 438 P.2d at 38, 39.
223. Graham, supra note 218.
224. Id. at 52; John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 501.
225. Graham, supra note 218, at 69-71.
226. See id. at 68-69; see also Finkelstein & Fairley, supra note 5, at 494-495 (illustrating
the ease with which opposing counsel can undermine an expert's testimony by bringing out the
inadequacy of the underlying data).
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Where the evidence is overwhelming, the expert will be capable, often
during cross-examination, of couching the evidence in terms that
drain it of its probative value. Of course, this analysis assumes of the
expert an ethical stance deeply embracing the truth-seeking value of
evidence. Some may find this a Pollyannaish approach to law, given
the realities of modem litigation. High ideals, however, seem to befit
the rather lofty nature of academic comment.
Finally, Frye has been most frequently targeted at criminal trial
evidence.227 This has also been the case in California. 28 The Collins
court's refusal to apply Frye to probability analysis places it at odds
with the general, prior approach and requires justification. It also
suggests that the court failed to fully consider the available avenues of
adjudicating this difficult question.
The conflict between Collins and Frye has never been harmonized
by the courts of California.229 The two cases have often been cited,
however, in the same opinion, and their respective tests applied.230
The simultaneous application of these tests is more than a mere juxta-
position and results in a weakening of both standards. Where a court
applies a higher standard of admissibility to one type of evidence
without giving an explanation for the departure from accepted meth-
ods of determination, it works a detriment to both standards. When
the accepted standard is clearly applicable, yet not followed, it will
most likely be seen by courts as arbitrary and lacking universal appli-
cation. This causes the old standard to lose its probative force in
future cases, and within the practicing community in general. The
new standard, in turn, is weakened by a similar rationale. The new
standard's criteria may seem to have been arbitrarily derived, raising
the question of whether it is a unique deviation for which there might
be very sound reasons which cannot be determined by the practi-
tioner, or a new trend in the court's jurisprudence. Either way, the
conflict between the standards hinders efficient resolution of future
scientific theory admissibility questions.
The Frye standard, by its own admission, allows for changes of
viewpoint within the scientific community. That is, while a particular
application of science itself may not change appreciably, if its accepta-
227. Graham, supra note 215, at 54.
228. A survey of California cases available through computer-assisted databases reveals a
ratio of criminal to civil applications of Frye of approximately 4:1.
229. But see People v. Yorba, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (attempting to
illustrate that the Collins standard is not in contradiction with admissibility of ABO blood-
grouping statistics); Cramer v. Morrison, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (likewise
attempting to rationalize the admissibility of Human Leukocyte Antigen statistics).
230. See, e.g., Yorba, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641; People v. Coleman, 759 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1988).
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bility within the "community" changes through time, the Frye stan-
dard allows the rules of admissibility to change accordingly. 231 The
Frye standard should have been relied upon to argue for the admis-
sion of the new scientific evidence.232
Collins has not been read so generously.233 It may be argued that
the Collins court allowed for the future use of probabilistic evidence.
In its opening paragraph the court alleges that mathematics and evi-
dentiary proof at trial are not necessarily incompatible, but that the
technique employed in the instant case was insufficient to qualify for
admission.234 However, the rather sweeping nature of the decision
effectively obliterates the use of such evidence, and subsequent Cali-
fornia courts have applied the precedent with vigor.233 Since the two
tests provide for different results with regard to the future admissibil-
ity of probability analysis, courts should articulate some valid reason
for applying the more stringent Collins test over the Frye standard.
No such rationale has been proffered. Either both tests can con-
tinue to exist side by side, sending inconsistent messages, or one test
must be discarded. In the context of probabilistic evidence, the Col-
lins test could be discarded, making the Frye standard more universal
in its application. Probabilistic evidence would still be subject to the
same requirements established by the Collins court-namely, that the
theory be generally accepted by statisticians, that it is of the type that
requires expert testimony (since it lies outside the ken of the average
juror), and that an adequate foundation be laid and no abuse of the
theory be present in the analysis. This level of protection would be
consistent with the protection afforded other types of scientific
evidence.
231. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (stating that scientific application at hand had "not yet gained
such standing" (emphasis added)).
232. This assumes, of course, that appellate counsel is on her toes, which was clearly not the
case in Collins. The court did not even address the application of Frye to the case at hand,
even though Frye had been adopted in California and in other jurisdictions at the time. It is
safe to assume that the court would have decided the question had it been brought to its
attention, if only to prevent the issue from being raised in future appeals.
233. The Collins test may seem to allow for the future admission of probabilistic evidence,
but whether this is in fact the case is unclear at this time. The rule in California at present is
not clearly stated and does not track the language or logic of Collins very closely. The
opinions allowing any statistical evidence tend to obfuscate the issues involved rather that
addressing them directly and clearly articulating any standards. See, e.g., People v. Axell, 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Bodenschatz, 93 Cal. Rptr. 471. The one thing that is
clear from the opinions is that the Collins test does not lend itself to the type of flexibility and
adaptability that the Frye test does.
234. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33.




The test used by the court in People v. Collins to determine the
admissibility of probabilistic evidence is inconsistent both internally
and in its application to other cases. The test is based in large part
upon the unfounded fear that opposing counsel will be unable to
defend herself against the imagined onslaught of overwhelmingly
powerful, yet misleading, evidence. The Collins test has further been
shown to be in conflict with the Frye standard, which enjoys a rare
universality in application and has been thoroughly considered and
refined throughout the better part of this century.
It is ineffective to continue to rely on the case of People v. Collins
to help further the interesting and vigorous debate on the admissibil-
ity of probabilistic evidence in general, and Bayesian analysis in par-
ticular. The case simply fails to be convincing, or to shed any real
light on the question of the validity and probative force of probabilis-
tic evidence.
APPENDIX-THE BASICS OF PROBABILITY
An "event" is the outcome of a true/false inquiry.2 36 That is, the
result of inquiring into a given state or condition establishes its truth
(the table is green) or falsity (the table is not green), and this outcome
is the event. Events are usually denoted by capital letters, such as G
(green) or B (not green, say, blue, perhaps). 37 Events may always
happen together, sometimes happen together, or never happen
together. For example, blue eyes sometimes accompany blond hair;
being male never accompanies being female. Terms of art have been
developed to describe such relations. The basic relations are conjunc-
tion, disjunction and negation.238 There are mathematical symbols
which may be used to denote these relations, or one may use standard
grammatical symbols.239
Conjunction exists (is "true") when both of any two events are
"true. ' 240 That is, when both events are positive, as positive is
defined, then conjunction exists. If green is positive, then a blue table
is "false." If a table is positive, then a chair is false. However, if one
discovers a green table, then there is conjunction. Conjunction can be
236. ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 416.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 417.
239. For example, the conjunction of blue eyes (event "A") and blond hair (event "B") may
be denoted using mathematical symbols as "A n B" or "A A B," or simply denoted using
standard grammatical symbols as "A & B." Id.
240. Id.
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symbolized "A & B," for the conjunction of A and B.241
Disjunction is not the opposite of conjunction. Disjunction
occurs when one or both 242 of two events are true.243 Thus, if G is
true for green, and T is true for a table, then disjunction is true for a
green chair, a blue table, or a green table.2 " Disjunction is symbol-
ized by "A or B." Note that the "or" does not exclude the possibility
of both events being true by definition.
Finally, negation occurs only when one condition is mutually
exclusive of another.245 That is, negation exists when two situations
cannot exist together. Thus, if event M is true when one is male, then
being female, F, is the negation of M. 246 Negation is symbolized "not
A."
These relations can be used to compute probabilities of random
events. An "ambit" of events is the set of events which are of inter-
248tieest.24 7 Before performing any calculations, one assigns 18 probabilities
to each event. 249 The resulting symbol is P(X), the probability of X
being true. This probability and the probabilities of all other members
of the ambit are required for computations of the aggregated charac-
teristics. 25° The assigning of these probabilities must also follow the
axioms of probability theory.25 ' These axioms are simply defined, and
must be accepted as true for our purposes.
There are four axioms. Three of these are fundamental and
require no derivation. (1) 0 < P(X) < 1 (any A in the ambit).252 This
axiom says that the probability of any single event in the ambit must




244. Note that there are a myriad of furniture pieces and colors which make disjunction
true, but only one combination (a green table) which makes conjunction true. Also, when
conjunction is true, then disjunction of those same two events is also true, since conjunction is
a subset of disjunction. Disjunction, obviously, is not always conjunction.
245. ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 417.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 419. In the Collins case the six characteristics mentioned supra note 108 make
up the ambit.
248. One must use an accepted method grounding this assignment in fact if the resulting
number is to be relevant. See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.




253. Note that "inclusive" allows for the possibility of the limiting numbers being equal to
the variable quantity, i.e., the probability of any event may equal either 0 or I.
254. ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 419.
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stands for the "sure" event, that is, an event which is always true.255
Its probability is 1, which indicates that it is "certain," and must
occur.256 (3) If A & B = 4), then P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B).257 4 is
the "impossible" event, whose probability must be 0.258 If A and B
can never happen together, then their conjunction (A & B) is impossi-
ble (4). When this is true, the probability that (A or B) exists is the
sum of the probability of A and the probability of B. 259 These axioms
provide for the use of probability theories. The axioms may be used
to produce properties of probability distribution.260 These properties
are vital for in-depth study of the probabilistic debate. There is
another definition which is necessary to introduce Bayes' Theorem,26'
the most prevalent of the theories in the debate.
The fourth axiom requires some derivation. One can imagine a
situation in which (A & B) may or may not exist together,262 in which
the existence of one event is somehow conditioned on the existence of
some other event. This makes up the fourth basic axiom of
probability theory.263 This axiom states that (4) P(A & B) = P(AB)
x P(B). 2 4 This equation says that the probability of the conjunction
of A and B is equal to the product of the probability of A, conditioned
on B, times the probability of B.
Bayes' Theorem may be derived from using these four basic axi-
oms. This derivation is beyond the scope of this probability "primer,"
but basically consists of the manipulation of algebraic operators 265
and the substitution of defined relations therein, which are themselves
derived from the axioms. Bayes' Theorem may be stated in different
ways, 266 but the simplest way for our purpose here is P(BIA) =
P(AIB)P(B)/P(A).267 In words, this says that the probability of B,
conditioned on A, is equal to the probability of A, conditioned on B,
times the probability of B, divided by the probability of A.
The applications and intricacies are more fully set forth in
255. Id. at 417.
256. Id. at 419.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 417.
259. Note that although disjunction allows A and B to exist together, this axiom defines this
circumstance as impossible for this equation to hold.
260. ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 419-420.
261. Id. at 422.
262. Id. at 421.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Algebraic operators are multiplication, addition, etc.
266. McCord, supra note 33, at 748 n.22.
267. ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 8, at 422.
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Anderson & Twining's text, Appendix I by Philip Dawid.268 The cur-
rent appendix, however, should be sufficient to fully ground the
reader in an understanding of those properties and axioms which are
often glossed over in academic commentary. Using those algebraic
functions with which any college graduate should be acquainted along
with this appendix, the more intricate and complex properties and
theories present in more advanced commentary should be more
comprehensible.
MARK L. HUFFMAN
268. Id., at App. I.
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